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A. Kerrest de Rozavel and F. G. von der Dunk 
 
1. Introduction: Liability under International Space Law 
 
It is probably difficult to overstate the importance of liability and the related area of insur-
ance when domestic legislation in the field of space activities is concerned, as such activi-
ties still constitute a relatively hazardous undertaking and the risks of something going 
horribly wrong are always close at hand. Moreover, though fortunately so far major acci-
dents as a consequence of space activities—at least on earth—have not occurred, if they 
would occur there should be little doubt that they may cause major damage, potentially 
even of a catastrophic size. As a consequence, the question as regards who would be liable 
to pay for such damage, and as a follow-up whether and to what extent insurance might 
(have to) cover such liability compensation, is indeed of great importance. 
In the context of national authorisation specifically, the issue of liability is framed by the 
general framework developed at the international level by means, principally, of Article 
VII of the Outer Space Treaty1 and the Liability Convention.2 The starting point in this 
respect is the principled allocation of liability for damage caused by a space object to the 
“launching State” or “launching States” of that space object. 
Article II of the Liability Convention provides in this respect: “A launching State shall be 
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface 
of the Earth or to aircraft in flight,”3 whereas Article III along the same lines provides: “In 
the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth to a space 
object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object by a 
space object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to 
its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.”4 
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The Liability Convention defines the “launching State” for the purposes of these clauses 
as: “(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A State from 
whose territory or facility a space object is launched.”5 The fact that this definition may 
result in several states being liable for the same damage-causing event—a space object may 
be launched by one state on behalf of another, which thus has “procured” the launch in 
question6—does not take away any liability but merely results in liability being joint and 
several.7 
 
2. The Problems Resulting from the International Regime on the Domestic Level 
 
The exclusively public nature of liability for damage caused by space activities (more 
accurately, by the space objects involved in such activities) as it arises, at least as far as 
international space law is concerned, thus includes cases of fundamental or even compre-
hensive involvement of private actors in the launch or operation of that space object. This 
in turn means that national authorisation will always be connected to issues of public con-
trol over the private involvement in such activities, to ensure that such involvement takes 
place only with reasonable guarantees as to the capabilities of the entities involved to safely 
conduct them, and of risk sharing between the states and private entities concerned: the 
“launching State” is principally liable for activities of private operators. 
A further problem arises where such liability of the “launching State” on the interna-
tional level is neither limited in amount nor in time. As to the first point, the Liability Con-
vention provides that: “The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay 
for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with international 
law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect 
of the damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or international organi-
zation on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would have existed 
if the damage had not occurred”.8 This clause has been generally interpreted to mean that 
regardless of cost, in principle the injured party should be fully restored to its previous 
situation, meaning full and complete compensation.9 
As to the second point, while the Liability Convention imposes some time limits on the 
possibility to assert a claim under it, these refer to the time lapsed between the time of the 
accident alternatively the time at which the injured party could be presumed to have be-
come aware thereof and the time of the claim.10 As to the time period between the launch 
of the space object and any involvement therein as a launching State, and the actual event 
causing the damage, there is no limitation provided in the Convention. Once having qual-
ified as a “launching State”: a state will always remain a “launching State”; and as such 
will remain liable as long as the space object has the capacity of causing damage. 
Specifically the definition of space object as including component parts thereof has been 
acknowledged to include any fragment thereof after (partial) disintegration in outer space, 
for example as a consequence of malfunctioning or collision with space debris.11 As a con-
sequence, even such a fragment, if causing damage many years after the original launch of 
the space object of which it formed part and after being separated from the original space 
object, would lead to the liability of the original “launching State (s)” (assuming only that 
these can still be identified). 
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At the same time, the occurrence of damage leading to such legal consequences under 
international space law as sketched above does not exclude claims regarding the liability 
of operators. Article XI of the Liability Convention namely allows for private claims to be 
pressed ahead regardless of any claims under the Convention, as it provides: “Nothing in 
this Convention shall prevent a State, or natural or juridical persons it might represent, 
from pursuing a claim in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching 
State.”12 In other words, an injured party has the option to press for liability compensation 
in the national courts of the “launching State” in case he considers the chances of success 
and/or a more effective compensation to be better in such a context. In particular an injured 
party of a private nature may be interested in doing so in view of his limitations to press 
for claims under the Liability Convention.13 In sum, the private victim has the choice of the 
procedure: it may either ask its own state to enter into the  procedures provided by the 
Liability Convention, or it may use by itself the usual legal way to obtain satisfaction under 
domestic law before a domestic judge. 
From the other end, such claims can obviously also be addressed to private operators, 
involving national law as relevant. This results in complications as soon as both the 
“launching State” itself is addressed under the Liability Convention with a claim under 
international space law possibly to be solved by means of a Claims Commission14 and the 
private party involved in the space object’s activities at issue is faced with a claim in a 
private capacity in the courts of that state applying national laws for the purpose. 
As a further consequence of the above, under domestic implementation mechanisms 
usually appropriate insurance or financial guarantees are required from the private oper-
ator, as states want to get their money back if they would be held liable as a “launching 
State” for damage caused by the activities of that operator. For example, the UK Outer 
Space Act mandates the Secretary of State to condition the grant of a license by “requiring 
the licensee to insure himself against liability incurred in respect of damage or loss suffered 
by third parties, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, as a result of the activities authorised 
by the licence.”15 Equally, in Belgium the appropriate Minister may “create an obligation 
for insurance to be taken out in favour of third parties to cover the damage that may result 
from the activities authorised by him.”16 
Here, a specific problem results from the aforementioned international lack of a limit to 
the liability resulting from damage caused by space activities, both in terms of amount and 
time-wise: insurers cannot manage a risk unlimited in amount and in time—alternatively, 
require exceptionally high premiums to establish a wide margin of safety. It is for such 
reasons that for example the US licensing regime not only imposes a limit to the possible 
reimbursement of the licensee due for international liability as such, but includes in the 
determination of any limit for a particular license the extent to which “the maximum lia-
bility insurance [for the amount under consideration as maximum would be] available on 
the world market at reasonable cost.”17 
This solution clearly entails a willingness on the side of the US government to accept 
the possibility that in cases of damage of catastrophic size reimbursement by the licensee 
respectively his insurer will not be able to cover compensation paid under the Liability 
Convention. In other words, the US government acts de facto as a kind of re-insurer for 
international damage above the amounts quoted in the license. 
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Such willingness, however, should not be presumed. In the European context, for ex-
ample, Sweden determines the reimbursement obligation in the Act on Space Activities 
simply as “If the Swedish State on account of undertakings in international agreements has 
been liable for damage which has come about as a result of space activities carried on by 
persons who have carried on the space activity shall reimburse the State what has been 
disbursed on account of the above-mentioned undertakings, unless special reasons tell 
against this.”18 
 
3. National Framework Laws as a Mechanism to Deal with Liability and Insurance 
 
From a bird’s-eye perspective, the mechanism most often chosen by states to deal with any 
international space law issues in the context of their domestic legal systems is to draft a 
framework law, laying down the ground rules for the licensing process whilst merely in-
dicating the substantive obligations to be included in specific licenses, or at best outlining 
them. As for the liability and insurance issues, this amounts usually to insertion in the 
national space law or act of a principled obligation to indemnify the state comprehensively 
if the latter would have to pay an international liability claim under the Liability Conven-
tion, but also to allowing for case-by-case deviations from that general rule without much 
detailed guidance on when such partial exemptions should be admissible. 
The case of Sweden has already been referred to supra, but also other European states 
essentially follow this approach. The United Kingdom equally comprehensively requires 
that “A person to whom this Act applies shall indemnify Her Majesty’s government in the 
United Kingdom against any claims brought against the government in respect of damage 
or loss arising out of activities carried on by him to which this Act applies.”19 It does then 
temper the de facto effect of this provision not only by its requirement for insurance up to 
a limit discussed supra, but also by the sweeping competence of the Secretary of State to 
“except ( . . . ) persons or activities from the requirement of a license if he is satisfied that 
the requirement is not necessary to secure compliance with the international obligations of 
the United Kingdom,” in other words inter alia as long as he considers a cap sufficient to 
take care of those concerns.20 
The Russian Federation has a quite complex formulation to deal with the twin issues of 
liability reimbursement and insurance of the licensee for such events. Firstly, “[t]he types, 
forms, and terms of licenses, the conditions and procedures for their issue, withholding, 
suspension or termination, as well as other questions of licensing shall be regulated by 
legislation of the Russian Federation”—in other words, are deferred for the time being to 
further implementation.21 Secondly, however, the phrases “[t]he Russian Federation shall 
guarantee full compensation for direct damage inflicted as a result of accidents occurring 
while carrying out space activities in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federa-
tion” and “[c]ompensation for damage inflicted as a result of accidents occurring while 
carrying out space activities shall be paid by the organizations and citizens responsible for 
operation of the space technics involved” seems to suggest unlimited liability reimburse-
ment would be the baseline rule.22 
Thirdly, regarding the relationship between liability reimbursement and insurance it is 
provided that “the liability of organizations and citizens participating in the creation and 
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use of space technics for damage inflicted as a result of accidents occurring while carrying 
out space activities shall be limited to the amount of the insured sum or insurance indem-
nity provided in contracts of insurance of space technics and risks involved in space activ-
ities”—but also: “if the insured sum or insurance indemnity is insufficient for 
compensation of the damage inflicted as a result of accidents occurring while carrying out 
space activities, recourse may be taken against the property of relevant organizations and 
citizens in the manner specified in legislation of the Russian Federation.”23 This suggests, 
at least, a limitation to reimbursement in first instance whilst nevertheless allowing the 
Russian authorities a basis for claiming reimbursement of amounts above such limits if 
warranted by special circumstances. 
Finally, on insurance itself the Law provides “[t]he organizations and citizens which 
exploit space technics or on whose order the creation and use of space technics for scientific 
and national-economy purposes is carried out, shall take compulsory insurance coverage 
in the amount set by legislation of the Russian Federation.”24 Whereas it is not unequivo-
cally clear that such insurance would cover the reimbursement obligation, that may at least 
be assumed.25 
Throwing in the competences of the licensing authority (that is Roskosmos, the Russian 
Space Agency) to determine the particular contents of any license,26 the result is that the 
requirements regarding liability and insurance can be tailored very much to specific in-
stances at hand—but also a concurrent lack of legal certainty and transparency, which in 
the case of Russia is further heightened by the complications resulting from the transition 
of the old communist system to a modern and balanced version of capitalism. 
Then there are the largely similar approaches taken by the two neighbouring low coun-
tries, Belgium and The Netherlands. 
The Belgian Space Law is the first European one making explicit reference in the oper-
ative Article both to Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and to the Liability Convention.27 
It comes as no surprise therefore that the reimbursement of the unlimited liability thus 
explicitly referred to is itself in principle unlimited as well, although the licensing authority 
is allowed to cap such reimbursement liability, as long as the licensee will “comply with 
the conditions attached to his authorization.”28 The Law itself does not provide for an ob-
ligation to take out insurance, but the licensing authority may “create an obligation for 
insurance to be taken out in favour of third parties to cover the damage that may result 
from the activities authorised by him” whenever granting the license.29 
The Dutch Space Law, following roughly two years upon the Belgian one, equally starts 
from the presumption of unlimited reimbursement, then mitigates that by key references 
to the insurance requirements to be imposed individually per license. As for the applicable 
liability arrangement, “if the State is obliged to pay compensation under Article VII of the 
Outer Space Treaty or the Liability Convention, the State is entitled to recover this sum, in 
full or in part, from the party whose space activity has caused the damage.”30 Next, how-
ever, such obligatory redress to the Dutch government is effectively capped by the value 
of the sum insured,31 whilst as to this insurance obligation “the prospective holder shall 
have and maintain what Our Minister considers to be the maximum possible cover for the 
liability arising from the space activities for which a licence is requested. Account is taken 
here of what can reasonably be covered by insurance.”32 
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The most recent European national space law that entered into force is the French one; 
as France however presents a special case in a number of respects, the French national law 
will be discussed in detail further below.33 
In sum, in all these cases the states concerned require reimbursement by the licensee in 
cases where they have had to pay compensation for damage caused by the licensed private 
activity as a consequence of which they had to honour liable claims under the Liability 
Convention. States may then in individual cases accept to limit this reimbursement, for 
example to a certain fixed amount or to the amount of insurance available on the market. 
 
4. National Liability and Insurance Arrangements, and Competition Law 
 
While the flexibility noted above in determining the substantive obligations regarding lia-
bility and insurance on the part of national authorities may perhaps be reasonable, both 
from the perspective of likely dealing with many quite different actors, cases and scenarios, 
and—at least in some cases—from the lack of experience of the relevant authorities with 
many actual licensing requests, these “case-by-case” solutions from a legal perspective 
raise some serious questions. They may well turn out to be disputable under competition 
rules, either domestic, or under the law of the European Community, or perhaps even un-
der WTO regulations. 
As for the latter, the World Trade Organisation (WTO)34 served inter alia to underpin the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)35 and the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS)36 with an institutional framework. The GATT is dedicated to abolishing 
or at least minimising all restrictions on international trade in goods, whereas the GATS is 
attempting to do the same for international trade in services. 
Space activities may, obviously, both involve trans-frontier movement of goods and 
trans-frontier provision of services, and in consequence be possibly caught by GATT and 
GATS regulations in cases where these have been agreed to be applicable to certain space 
activities. So far, this would largely be the case in the context of satellite communications, 
where a 1997 agreement concluded in the context of the GATS called for access of foreign 
satellite communication service providers to national markets on the basis of reciprocity, 
under so-called “individual schedules of commitment.”37 
Whilst the GATT and the GATS generally focus on the most clear-cut trade restrictions 
such as import tariffs and quota, in principle any requirement which restricts international 
trade if applied in a discriminatory fashion as between national and foreign entities is con-
sidered to be—at the very least—contrary to the spirit of the treaties. When therefore one 
space operator would be offered a set of obligations, including in particular those related 
to reimbursement and taking out insurance, in terms of his license being rather different 
from those offered to another space operator, this may well run afoul of that spirit in par-
ticular if the advantaged space operator is a national entity and the other a foreign one, 
presuming there is no objective, nondiscriminatory justification for making such a differ-
ence. 
As for EU law, the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union38 has provided 
for an even more extended regime in its efforts to create a level playing field in any eco-
nomic sector of concern. On the one hand, it established a regime for free movement of 
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inter alia goods and services between the EU member states,39 along the lines of the GATT 
and GATS but much more elaborated—and backed up with the adjudicative powers of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (QEU).40 
Imagine the likely consequence of the licensing systems being nationally implemented 
in the absence of any transparency and consistency (read legal certainty) at the level of the 
law. One company can be provided with a limit to liability and/or to its insurance obliga-
tion under a national license because it is of the nationality of the licensing state, whilst 
another company being of a different EU member state cannot avail itself of such limits 
because it would not be eligible to such a license, or not entitled to the same conditions if 
it is. Once this would come to be envisaged as “restrictions” imposed upon the latter which 
are not applied “without distinction on grounds of nationality or residence,” in principle 
it would be prohibited by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.41 
The main legal obstacle so far standing in the way of actually applying such principles 
and rules to the licensing of private space operators is the absence of competence at the EU 
level in the space sector (with the exception of satellite communications, as will be seen): 
liberalisation of services along the lines of the regime of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union requires specific Directives.42 The first instance where a principled 
legislative competence of the European Union in the space sector was provided for, was 
the (aborted) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.43 Unfortunately, perhaps, it 
was preserved in the Treaty of Lisbon only with an added caveat that the parallel compe-
tence of the Union thus established was specifically “excluding any harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States.”44 
On the other hand, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also estab-
lished a quite encompassing competition regime, which may even present a more solid 
basis for tackling the lack of consistency and transparency in the provision of licenses, po-
tentially leading to market distortions. The most important clause here concerns the com-
prehensive prohibition on state aid, which reads: “Save as otherwise provided in the 
Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form what-
soever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the internal market.”45 
As practice has shown, the term “any aid” is usually taken literally, and although the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union itself already allows for certain excep-
tions and exemptions from the application of the state aid-regime,46 these are subject to 
scrutiny by the EU institutions.47 Offering private space operators limits to their third-party 
liability through a national license where otherwise unlimited liability would result in it-
self is a form of state aid, since the state acts as de facto reinsurer for any amount of com-
pensation beyond the limit due under the regime of the Liability Convention, thus 
relieving the company concerned of certain risks and/or costs it would otherwise incur. 
Offering it to licensees, read national companies, of one EU member state only, would then 
indeed distort or threaten to distort competition: insurance premiums in this high-risk sec-
tor form a major part of the total cost of operations, and if one EU company is offered a 
certain cap on its liability, whereas another is not (or a much higher cap) there can be little 
doubt this is a distorting factor. 
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Most feasibly, the possibility for an exemption from application would arise on the basis 
of such a form of aid constituting “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.”48 The argument could be that the 
space sector is still very much in its infancy, with as of yet not that much competition oc-
curring within the EU Internal Market anyway, and hence deserves some protection for 
the time being. The “common interest” referred to could well lie in the need for Europe to 
build up a strong space sector in order to compete with the non-European giants, where 
for example the US space industry would indirectly be supported (“aided”) by the US gov-
ernment buying products or services exclusively from US providers.49 
As indicated, the main exception to the EU rules on free movement, free provision of 
services and competition so far not being applicable to the space sector, is the satellite com-
munications sector—not accidentally the one sector of space where, also in Europe, a major 
commercial market has arisen. Thus, here the Commission and the Council have under-
taken efforts to liberalise those markets and create one single Internal Market for satellite 
communication services. Part of that effort was trying to ensure that the licensing of space 
activities at the domestic level would not result in major distortions in the level playing 
field. 
The process took off with a first Green Paper in 1987, a political document calling for 
liberalisation of the environment for telecommunications, as of yet excluding satellite com-
munications in view of the special character of that sector.50 That omission was repaired 
when a second Green Paper three years later addressed satellite communications specifi-
cally along the same lines.51 The general economic and legal principles asserted by those 
Green Papers then led to the 1994 Satellite Directive, the first piece of EU legislation on the 
matter.52 As its full title indicated, the Satellite Directive essentially provided for the appli-
cation of some older Directives on the introduction of the Internal Market regime in the 
areas of terminal equipment and service provision to the satellite communication sector.53 
As of yet, this excluded the licensing process proper, but soon the Commission in par-
ticular realised that liberalising the European satellite communication markets at some 
point would not be possible without proper harmonisation of the national processes of 
licensing the operators. A true Internal Market for satellite communications could never 
result if major regulatory distortions following from rather divergent—not to mention 
nontransparent—conditions imposed by the various relevant national licensing authorities 
would be allowed to exist. 
Thus, in the decade following the enunciation of the Satellite Directive, several further 
pieces of EU legislation were drafted. Thus, a 1997 Decision called for a first level of har-
monisation of national authorisation processes—but only for the subsector of personal 
handheld satellite services.54 A Directive that same year harmonised the “framework” for 
licensing of all satellite communication operators—by listing the categories of conditions 
that could be imposed upon licensees, leaving wide discretion to the national licensing 
authorities to actually apply it,  even if in a discriminatory fashion.55 That the whole process 
in this area was fraught with difficulties and resistance of certain member states against 
EU-level interference with their national prerogatives became clear when eleven years later 
it was still necessary to draft a Decision on the authorisation of mobile satellite services.56 
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Clearly, by that time the original aim of an EU-wide licensing process principally con-
ducted at the EU level had effectively disappeared behind the horizon. 
Not being able to harmonise the licensing of satellite communication operators at the 
European level, it will be clear that the Union also did not manage any harmonisation so 
far of any attendant liability and insurance issues in that context. This, however, in the end 
may not be so relevant for our present perspective to the extent international third-party 
space law liability is the principal subject of attention for national licensing authorities. 
Such liability, as regulated under the Liability Convention, very much attaches to the 
states involved in the launch of a space object through the key concept of the “launching 
State”—and hence is essentially triggered by the practical and legal situation at the launch. 
This means, that also for satellite operators—and the states supposed to license them—the 
issue of liability as far as the Liability Convention is concerned arises only to the extent 
they would be involved in that launch. In other words, any flow-down consequences of 
liability under the Liability Convention would principally be arranged in the launch con-
tract and the licenses for the launch, not in the context of the licenses for operating the satel-
lites—which is what the Union has focused on, for Internal Market–related reasons. Not 
accidentally, in the few pieces of EU law referred to above, no clauses deal with liability 
potentially arising as a consequence of the international third-party space law regime in 
any substantive sense. 
Nevertheless, once a satellite operator duly licensed causes damage covered by the Li-
ability Convention, as it will very likely be assessed to have procured the launch of the 
satellite at issue, the licensing state may  also be implicated by that procurement and be 
considered to be the “State which (. . .) procures the launching of a space object” for the 
purposes of triggering the application of the Liability Convention57—in which case the is-
sue of whether that state can be reimbursed for any compensation paid under the license 
arises again. In that context, major differences in reimbursement and insurance obligations, 
as a result of nontransparent and flexible—and sometimes plainly absent—national licens-
ing systems could still be considered distortions of the satellite market in Europe. 
 
5. The US Model for Dealing with Liability and Insurance in the Domestic Context 
 
No doubt partly due to its large role in space activities and its principled support for pri-
vate enterprise, the United States choose to take a far more detailed approach in dealing 
with licensing issues in the domestic context. Tailor-made licensing systems were devel-
oped for the various sectors of space where private enterprise became a player in its own 
right. In 1970, the 1934 Communications Act58 was declared by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC), the licensing authority for all private US telecommunication ac-
tivities, to be applicable also to telecommunications involving satellites.59 Once the remote 
sensing sector seemed mature enough to be (partly) privatised, the 1984 Land Remote 
Sensing Commercialization Act60 provided for the authority of  the National Oceano-
graphic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to license private parties interested in 
operating satellite remote sensing systems, an authority not fundamentally changed by the 
1992 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act.61 Finally, now that private spaceflight—often 
loosely labelled “space tourism”—seems about to take off, interim legislation has already 
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been developed by the US authorities dealing with this specific new type of private space 
activity.62 
In view of the abovementioned focus of the international liability regime emanating 
from the Liability Convention on the launch of a space object and the entities crucially 
involved in it, neither the Communications Act nor the remote sensing acts provided ar-
rangements on third-party liability and insurance for it, whereas the new act regulating 
private spaceflight for the time being is an extension of the general legislation applicable 
to launch activities. 
This brings analysis finally to the Commercial Space Launch Act, which not only indeed 
deals very fundamentally with issues of third-party liability, including those falling within 
the scope of the Liability Convention, but actually constitutes a considerably more sophis-
ticated mechanism than those provided by the states discussed before. The original version 
of the Act was drafted in 1984,63 then amended fundamentally in 1988,64 and finally codi-
fied as part of the United States Code in 1994.65 
The mechanism resulting from this legislation in terms of liability starts with the deter-
mination of the “maximum probable loss”66 for each particular launch by the licensing au-
thority, which is the Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation with  the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).67 Obviously, the maxi-
mum probable loss varies depending upon the actual risk of something going wrong and 
the related potential size of damage caused, taking into account factors such as the size 
and complexity of launch vehicle and satellite, track record versus novelty of technology, 
and launch trajectory. 
The amount arrived at under the maximum probable loss determination will be inserted 
as cap on the liability of the licensee, including a liability to reimburse the US government 
in case of claims under the Liability Convention, as well as on the insurance he is obliged 
to take out,68 unless either no liability insurance would be available for the amount at issue 
“at reasonable cost” or the maximum probable loss would go beyond US$ 500,000,000, 
corrected for inflation, in which case the lowest amount concerned provides the cap on 
liability and insurance obligation.69 
If an accident would occur and damage would result so as to trigger liability under the 
license, the licensee will have to compensate the damage up to the ceiling thus provided. 
In case the compensation exceeds the cap, the US government will carry the burden of such 
excess compensation, up to an express limit of US$ 1,500,000,000, corrected for inflation.70 
As a matter of fact, however, two scenarios arise here, since this arrangement applies to 
any type of third-party damage the US government is concerned with, both that falling 
within the scope of the Liability Convention and hence giving rise to liability of the United 
States itself and that falling outside of its scope, hence giving rise to direct liability of the 
private operator under US national law and before a US court. 
In the latter case, the limit of US$1,500,000,000 means that, effectively, liability is capped 
by that amount as augmented by whatever cap was imposed upon the licensee in the li-
censee—which, as seen, in no case could exceed US$500,000,000.71 In the former case, how-
ever, regardless of US law arrangements, the liability remains principally unlimited as per 
the Liability Convention.72 In this case, the arrangement under the US act means that the 
licensee will be obliged to cover a first tier of damage up to the cap included in his license—
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again, under no circumstances more than US$500,000,000. If the damage exceeds that cap, 
a second tier of compensation actually is at the expense of the US government, in the sense 
that—up to an amount of US$1,500,000,000—the government accepts not being reim-
bursed by the licensee for that part of the international claim. In the (unlikely) event dam-
age would exceed even the combined total of US$1,500,000,000 and the cap included in the 
relevant license, a third tier would be at stake, where the US government under the Liabil-
ity Convention would still be obliged to compensate also that part—and it would be a 
matter for internal US law whether and to what extent the US government can de lege call 
upon the licensee to reimburse him for that part, too (to the extent the licensee would of 
course de facto have the assets to do that). 
This extended and detailed mechanism is rather good as it protects the victim, who has 
a better chance to receive appropriate compensation and has a choice of means: he can sue 
the company in a domestic court and does not need to use the long state-to-state procedure 
of the Liability Convention,73 and even so may be rather comprehensively compensated—
with the Liability Convention’s unlimited compensation always as a stick behind the door 
in case of truly catastrophic-size damage. At the same time, this system also protects the 
US private companies, as these are provided a cap on liability respectively reimbursement, 
which clarifies their risk and therefore eases financing their project, and may get insurance 
at a reasonable cost for whatever cap is provided. 
It also testifies to the feasibility of a state to enact domestic legislation on space activities 
by private enterprise taking into consideration not only its own liability but also the pos-
sible liability of its companies. The states discussed before may be focusing on being reim-
bursed; the United States has chosen a more balanced approach that also supports its 
private industry involvement in space activities. 
The US arrangements as developed from the original Commercial Space Launch Act 
onwards also have some downsides. A first point here follows from the extended control 
of the US Congress as payment of a catastrophic claim is subject to the Congressional ap-
propriation process. The claims must be presented to the Congress by the President upon 
the recommendation of the Secretary of Transportation, the Congress must appropriate 
funds to pay the claim.74 
Secondly, the mechanism is not automatic, nor is it permanent, but subject to a sunset 
provision. Contrary to the position of the House of Representatives, which did in addition 
to not proposing a cap on government indemnification not include a sunset provision, the 
Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee refused to accept such a perma-
nent form of support. It proposed a ten years period for the cap, later changed into a five 
years sunset provision. It considered that this support of private launching activity was 
not to be unlimited and should be deleted when the insurance market will be in a position 
to insure the total amount of the risk.75 During the discussion of the Act before the Con-
gress, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee determined that it is 
“necessary to ensure that the risk to the Government is restricted. This is both a protection 
of the public treasury and a means to foster and enhance the growth of private insurance 
markets over the life of the legislation.”76 The indemnification mechanism is thus only of-
fered for a limited amount of time. This sunset provision of 1988 has been extended four 
times since.77 
R O Z A V E L  A N D  V O N  D E R  D U N K ,  L I A B I L I T Y  A N D  I N S U R A N C E ,  2 0 1 1  
12 
Thirdly, as we have seen there is a limit to the guarantee of the state, at least when it 
comes to “national liability,” that is private claims pursued in US courts—of the cap on the 
licensee’s liability plus US$1,500,000,000, in 1988 terms. Whilst damage between 
US$1,500,000,000 and US$2,000,000,000 may seem astronomical in size, and a cap of that 
size cannot easily be imagined to be exceeded, one should not forget that in the unlikely 
event that a space object would hit the earth, it might do so at enormous speeds and indeed 
catastrophic damages may result. 
Fourthly, the liability arrangements are limited to the launch phase. At the highest level, 
the Commercial Space Launch Act itself does not make any specific reference to this point. 
It simply makes a license obligatory for a “launch” with all the attendant requirements to 
be included in the license—which do not, however, specify anything as to the definition of 
that launch or the coverage of third-party liability and/or indemnification clauses: the li-
censing authorities “shall specify the period for which the license issued or transferred 
under this chapter is in effect.”78 
At the second level, the Code of Federal Regulations then provided to a limitation of the 
insurance period as follows: “Insurance coverage (. . .) or other form of financial responsibil-
ity, shall attach upon commencement of licensed launch activities, and remain in full force 
and effect as follows: (1) Until completion of licensed launch activities at the launch site; 
and (2) For orbital launches, until the later of—(i) Thirty days following payload separa-
tion, or attempted payload separation in the event of a payload separation anomaly; or (ii) 
Thirty days from ignition of the launch vehicle.”79 
Thus, the problem of definition of the concept, both as to the beginning and end of the 
operations of “launch,” and thus of how extended the application of the Act in fact was, 
was left to the third level.80 Here, the FAA presents different definitions of the end of 
launch and “in the interest of safety” stands to its position “to define the end of a launch 
as the point after payload separation when the last action occurs over which a licensee has 
direct or indirect control over the launch vehicle.” When dealing with financial obligations, 
insurance coverage applies “until completion of licensed launch” and until the later of 
thirty days following payload separation or thirty days after ignition of the launch vehi-
cle.8l 
The conclusion here should be that after the launching phase so defined, the Commer-
cial Space Launch Act and its financial guarantee do not apply any more to damage occur-
ring on earth or in orbit. The support of the US government concentrates on the launching 
activity and not on life in orbit where the risk is considerably lower. 
The Regulations together thus clarify the duration of obligations to thirty days alterna-
tively—at least for suborbital launches—the time when according to “the risk analysis con-
ducted before the launch to determine [the Maximum Probable Loss] and specified in a 
licence order,” the “risk to third parties and Government property (. . .) is sufficiently small 
that financial responsibility is no longer necessary.”82 The period during which the liability 
and indemnification system applies is only thirty days, which means that on the one hand 
for instance the obligation of the Act related to insurance lasts only during the launching 
period stricto sensu, and on the other hand that the indemnification mechanism lasts only 
during thirty days—and not during the whole life in orbit of the satellite. The Act was not 
intended to deal with satellites in orbit but only with launches and reentry. The control 
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over satellites in orbit is maintained, to the extent it is, by other administrations like the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for remote sensing 
satellites and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for satellite telecommuni-
cations.83 
So far the only example more or less following the US approach concerns Australia—
accidentally or not, also a non-European state—which also has developed a rather detailed 
system for authorising private space activities. To begin with, it knows essentially of four 
types of licenses: (1) a “launch permit” for the launch of space objects from Australian 
territory or the return to Australia of space objects launched from Australia;84 (2) an “over-
seas launch certificate” for launch activities by Australian nationals conducted outside 
Australia;85 (3) an “authorisation” for the return to Australia of space objects launched else-
where;86 and (4) a “space license” for the operation of a launch facility on Australian terri-
tory.87 For each of those, a separate set of requirements applies.88 
As for liability, the Act specifically refers in its definitional section to the Liability Con-
vention, as well as distinguishing between liability periods in the context of the launch 
respectively the return of space objects covered by the Act.89 In further scoping the appli-
cation of the liability arrangements under the Act, specific reference is made to cases where 
“Australia is a launching State in relation to the object.”90 
The logical relationship thus established between domestic reimbursement obligations 
and the international liability of Australia as a consequence of qualifying as the “launching 
State” also means that the former are essentially limited to the launch permit and overseas 
launch certificate.91 The authorisation pertains to a space object launched elsewhere, so that 
Australia does not need to consider itself a launching state since at least one other states 
will qualify as such, whereas the space license concerns the operation of a launch facility, 
which as soon as involving a launch itself, requires a launch permit in addition. 
The basic requirement in case of a licensee’s activity leading to damage compensable 
under the Convention is full reimbursement of the Australian government: “the responsi-
ble party for the relevant launch or return is liable to pay (. . .) an amount equal to (. . .) the 
amount of that compensation.”92 However, the possibility for obtaining a limit to the reim-
bursement obligation by means of the launch permit or the overseas launch certificate is 
then offered;93 the limit being applicable “to the extent that the amount of the compensa-
tion would exceed the insured amount” subject to a few conditions amounting to compli-
ance with the other conditions of the permit or certificate as well as absence of intent to 
cause damage or gross negligence.94 
The abovementioned “insured amount” may also be replaced by an alternative “guar-
antee”: the requirement is considered fulfilled also if “the holder has, in accordance with 
the regulations, shown direct financial responsibility for the launch or return for an 
amount not less than the amount that would otherwise have been applicable.”95 As to that 
“amount,” it is then limited by a complex procedure providing for a “maximum cap” of 
A$ 750,000,000.96 
That is not to say that an authorisation can be obtained without any liability coverage. 
An authorisation also requires compliance inter alia with the insurance (alternatively finan-
cial responsibility) requirements above; the main difference is that the holder of an author-
isation can not avail himself of the limits to liability, only of the limits to insurance. In other 
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words, differently from the holder of a permit or certificate, the holder of an authorisation 
will be held liable beyond his insurance or financial responsibility in case the damage sur-
passes the latter; there is no principled protection from betting the company here.97 
The requirements for a space license, however, indeed are—at least as far as the Act 
itself is concerned—not inclusive of requirements regarding liability reimbursement or in-
surance.98 
 
6. The French Case Prior to 2008 
 
France for a long time has chosen an altogether different approach to authorising and con-
tinuously supervising private space activities for which it might be held internationally 
responsible and/or liable: not by means of either a framework law or a detailed national 
legal regime, but by de facto control of the private activities arising in the French context. 
The most obvious example is the launch service sector, in view of the direct relationship 
between launch activities and issues of liability. France houses Arianespace, currently the 
world’s number one in the commercial space launch services market, and undoubtedly a 
private company.99 It is also undoubtedly a French private company from a legal perspec-
tive, established under French law and headquartered in the French city of Toulouse. 
Moreover, it launches exclusively (so far) from the Kourou launch site in French Guyana, 
a piece of South-American territory falling under French sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, there are also some profound reasons why France could not—and did 
not—simply on its own take care of Arianespace activities, easily invoking responsibility 
and liability of the French state under international space law, by a national licensing re-
gime. Arianespace was using Ariane launch vehicles, which had been developed under 
various optional programmes of the European Space Agency (ESA),100 even if France had 
been the leading partner. Its operations from Kourou still required substantive support by 
ESA, including the use of key facilities there. And finally, most of the other ESA member 
states had private companies as substantial shareholders in Arianespace—albeit that the 
majority of shares were in French hands, and the majority within that majority was in the 
hands of the French space agency CNES. 
Thus, the normal functions of a license vis-à-vis private companies were taken care of, 
on the one hand, by the de facto control of CNES, a French government body, over the 
activities of Arianespace, and on the other hand by a triangle of legal documents involving 
Arianespace, France, and ESA. 
Firstly, there is the Arianespace Declaration of 1980, which was regularly renewed 
since.101 Under this Declaration, the member states of the European Space Agency partici-
pating in the commercialization of Ariane by means of Arianespace amongst others un-
dertake to support Arianespace in many ways.102 Furthermore, a Convention was signed 
between ESA and Arianespace providing for more details regarding inter alia the obliga-
tions of ESA in respect of Arianespace and vice versa.103 Finally, an agreement was con-
cluded by means of a continuing series of protocols between France and ESA concerning 
the use of the Centre Spatial Guyanais (CSG).104 
Specifically on the issues of licensing and insurance, the legal framework imposed upon 
Arianespace with respect to its launch operations proceeded from the assumption that it 
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is in first instance the liability of France as a launching state which needs to be taken care 
of, because its territory is used for all Arianespace’s launching activities.105 At the same 
time, however, also ESA qualifies as a “launching State” under the definition of Article I(c) 
of the Liability Convention at least as far as the substance is concerned, in view of the use 
of its Kourou facilities, and, in many cases, its procurement of the launch contract.106 
In the CSG Agreement, France then legally protects ESA and its member states against 
claims arising from launch activities undertaken by Arianespace.107 In fact one should dis-
tinguish between two different cases. For the launches operated for ESA programs, includ-
ing the three first Ariane development launches (such as the first ones with Ariane 5), ESA 
is liable and will safeguard France from any claims for damage—excluding wilful miscon-
duct by the French government or its agencies. 
By contrast, in cases between Arianespace and France where commercial launches of 
Arianespace lead to international third-party liability claims against France, Arianespace 
would be required to reimburse the French government up to a maximum amount of FF 
400 million (now some €61 million).108 Hence, France effectively acted as an insurance pro-
vider for Arianespace for any amount of damage occurring in a single accident which ex-
ceeds FF 400 million. 
Interestingly, in view of the complicated legal situation surrounding Arianespace 
launches, somewhat complicating also the clear distinction of third-party liability from in-
terparty liability, as to the latter the European Space Agency agrees to waive all claims for 
compensation against France, in as far as these claims result from launch operations at the 
Centre Spatial Guyanais.109 The exception provided here pertains to damage caused by 
“faute lourde, (. . .) acte ou (. . .) omission déliberés” on the French side.110 This phrase should 
probably be translated as “wilful misconduct” or “gross negligence,” but it is apparently 
for French courts to interpret when legal disputes arise on the matter.1l1 
The same structure—of de facto control—essentially applied to the other French private 
space company operating already for a number of years: Spot Image. In 1986, CNES had 
launched the SPOT-l satellite, with involvement of both Sweden and Belgium on a minority-
share basis, while Italy later also stepped in. Already in 1982, the private company Spot 
Image had been incorporated under French law and established in Toulouse to market and 
sell the remote sensing data collected by the SPOT satellites yet to be launched. Sharehold-
ers in Spot Image came, apart from France, from Belgium, Italy, and Sweden, the other 
states involved in financing the SPOT program. Spot Image, like Arianespace, was created 
in 1982 as a “Societe Anonyme” and subsidiary to CNES, which was moreover the largest 
single shareholder. Spot Image is now owned for 98.9% by EADS Astrium. 
Differently from the case of Arianespace, however, there was no discernible special 
need to arrange for third-party liability with a view to the Liability Convention: either Spot 
Image would be launched upon an Ariane vehicle, in which case French third-party liabil-
ity was already dealt with through the aforementioned construction pertaining to Ari-
anespace, or it would be launched somewhere else, in which case France could only be 
argued to a “launching State” in an indirect fashion at best.112 
Beyond Arianespace and Spot Image, lately with the privatisation of France Telecom as 
the French entity enjoying access to the international satellite networks of the old INTEL-
SAT,113 INMARSAT,114 and EUTELSAT,115 as well as with the privatisation of the latter so 
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as to become a French company, Eutelsat, more private entities became fundamentally ac-
tive in outer space for which France might directly be held liable, which started to threaten 
this system of de facto control—hence steps were taken to draft a proper French national 
space law. 
 
7. The 2008 French Law on Space Operations 
 
In 2004 the French Prime Minister asked the Conseil d’Etat116 to study the legal framework 
for space activities in France. A working group was created and proposed a draft of a law 
which was adopted by the government on April 2007 and passed as a law, the French Law 
on Space Operations, in June 2008.117 This text was elaborated by three decrees in June 2009, 
of which one is relevant here: Decree 2009-643.118 
A control mechanism is created for every activity in outer space which may cause France 
to be responsible according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty or liable under Article 
VII and the Liability Convention. 
Space operations are defined as “any activity consisting of launching or attempting to 
launch an object into outer space or in assuring control of a space object throughout the 
duration of its sojourn in outer space, including on the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
and also including where relevant at the time of its return to Earth.”119 Through the notion 
of “control of a space object” the application of the French Law on Space Operations is 
much larger than the US Commercial Space Launch Act which only applies to the launch 
itself; the former also includes the life in orbit of satellites and other space objects. 
There is an obligation to get an authorisation for any operator who intends to proceed 
to a launch from the French territory or using a facility under French jurisdiction (the cri-
terion of the territory or facility of launch), any French operator projecting to “assure con-
trol of such an object throughout the duration of its sojourn in outer space” (the obligation 
to control national activities120), or to launch a space object from a foreign territory or from 
a territory not subject to any state sovereignty (the criterion of the state which launches 
and procures the launch). The transfer of an authorised space object and the transfer of a 
space object to a French company are subject to prior authorisation.121 In order to ease the 
authorisation process for operators usually involved, a “license” mechanism has also been 
created. The “authorisation” is given for a specific activity; a “license” may be awarded to 
an operator which operates in outer space on an ongoing basis. 
 
7.1. The Authorisation Process 
A file containing every information required by the Decree is transmitted to the Minister 
in charge of outer space activities, which is currently the Minister of Research. It is then 
transmitted to CNES which controls the conformity of the system and procedures with the 
technical regulations in order to ensure public security and protection of the environment. 
It may ask for some complementary information. The President of CNES gives his advice 
within two months from the date of registration of the file. If the operator has a license, the 
delay is reduced to fifteen days.122 The Minister has four months to decide (or one if the 
claimant is a licensee); he may extend the delay by two months by a motivated decision. 
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Decree 2009-643 elaborates the requirements for authorisation. They are both adminis-
trative and technical. The administrative part deals with moral, financial, and professional 
qualifications of the operator; the technical one provides a description of the operation, 
quality control mechanism, environmental impact assessment, prevention of the risks of 
the operation including mitigation of space debris, prevention of collision, potential nu-
clear risks, and risks related to planetary protection.123 
A license may be obtained by habitual operators; its requirements mostly regard the 
qualification of the operator itself and his financial obligations. If the operator is licensed, 
his authorisation process will be eased or even waived for such habitual activities.124 
The controlling authority is the Minister in charge of outer space with an important tech-
nical advising role for the French space agency CNES. 
An obligation of insurance or financial guarantees is set by Article 6 of the Law on Space 
Operations and elaborated by Articles 16 through 18 of Decree 2009-643. The financial 
guarantees take the form of an insurance but also of other various financial guarantees or 
assets. If it is impossible to obtain coverage under the current status of the insurance mar-
ket, the Minister in charge of space and the Minister of Finance may exempt the operator 
from this obligation for a limited time.125 The Minister in charge of space may also exempt 
the operator of the obligation of insurance or guarantee for a geostationary satellite as long 
only as it maintains its position. The obligation thus applies only for change of orbit or 
orbital position.126 
Chapter III of Decree 2009-643 deals with the difficult problem of launch from a foreign 
territory or from facilities under the jurisdiction of a foreign state. In that case, France is of 
course a “launching state” at least as a state procuring the launch but is not in a position 
to control efficiently the operations. Article 12 decides that in that case the claimant pro-
vides for every element to appreciate the guarantees required by Article 4 of the Law on 
Space Operations exempting him from the conformity control. The Minister may accept 
this exemption or not. His refusal must be motivated. This solution is not very convincing 
because in practice it would be impossible to control activities conducted on the territory 
of a foreign state. The solution is not to require less information but to regulate and stream-
line the application of these requirements by passing agreements between the two launch-
ing states. These agreements should deal with the sharing of the obligation to indemnify 
the victims according to the phase. As far as the launching phase is concerned, the state of 
the launch should pay and guarantee the state procuring the launch. Reciprocally, the state 
procuring the launch should pay for the in-orbit phase and guarantee the state of the 
launch in case of an accident during this phase. 
Any activity involving the control of a space object is subject to authorisation. In case of 
a transfer of the control of a space object, an authorisation is needed. If the transferee is not 
subject to implementation of the French Law on Space Operations, the situation is more 
complex. We know the difficulty: under the Liability Convention France is going to remain 
a liable “launching State” without having real control over the transferred space object. On 
this issue Decree 2009-643 is not efficient—and moreover it is not in accordance with the 
current international legal framework. The liability issue is not really dealt with. The text 
asks for a proof of a transfer of registration of the object and its notification to the UN 
Secretary General. In fact, most of the time this may not be possible as, for the time being, 
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the transfer of registry of a space object is not possible if the state of the transferee is not 
one of the original launching states, because, according to Article 1 of the Registration Con-
vention,127 only a launching state can register a space object. 
Contrary to the solution in the US Commercial Space Launch Act, the control is not 
conducted by an independent body; the conscious choice was made to give CNES a central 
role in this respect. This may lead to a conflict of interests as CNES now acts both as judge 
and party. As a major shareholder of Arianespace and in charge of the Kourou launch port, 
it may have to appreciate the security of the competing launch ports when an authorisation 
is required for a launch from outside France. 
The authorisation or the license may be withdrawn in case of disrespect or if the opera-
tion could be a risk for France’s defence or respect of its international obligations.128 
 
7.2. Responsibility, Liability and Financial Obligations 
France being a launching state because of its territory in French Guyana, the legal situation 
is rather close to the US one. Thus the rationale of the mechanism follows closely the US 
Commercial Space Launch Act. 
Like the United States, France wants to support its space activities, especially the 
launching industry. It wants to avoid pushing operators towards a “bet the company” be-
haviour. Its financial obligations are limited to a certain amount in order to obtain insur-
ance and to clarify the financial risk of the operation. As in the US Commercial Space 
Launch Act, this limitation applies both if the victim chooses to use the protection of the 
Liability Convention129 or to sue the operator before a domestic judge.130 In both cases the 
ceiling applies and the government is going to pay if the damage exceeds it. 
Article 14 of the French Law on Space Operations deals with the possibility of the state 
to “take recourse action against the operator who has caused the damage having pledged 
the international liability of France.” If the operation was not authorised under the Law or 
in case of a deliberate fault, the ceiling of Articles 16 and 17 do not apply. 
Article 15 of the Law consider “the case where an operator has been ordered to indem-
nify a Third Party for damage caused by a space object used within the framework of an 
operation authorised by implementation of this present Law and provided the operation 
in question was conducted from French territory or from the territory of another Member 
State of the European Union” except in case of a deliberate fault. 
A distinction is made between two phases: the launch phase itself and the in-orbit phase. 
The launch phase “begins at the moment when the launch operations become irreversible 
and (. . .) terminates when the object destined to be placed in outer space is separated from 
the launcher.” The “in orbit phase” called “control phase” begins at the separation from 
the launcher and ends either after a deorbiting manoeuvre and passivation, return to earth 
or disintegration in the atmosphere, or if the operator has lost control of the object.13l 
For the launches from French territory, in fact currently from the Kourou Space Centre, 
a ceiling is set at the level of 60,000,000€ (equivalent to the former FF 400,000,000). The 
operator must get an insurance for this amount. In case of an accident, the insurance will 
cover the cost up to this level; to the extent the damage would rise above that amount, the 
French government will pay. This amount includes both damages to the launch pad or any 
installation on the ground even on the French territory132 and damage to third parties 
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whether they are caused on the earth or in outer space and whether they are liable under 
the Liability Convention or not.133 Contrary to the US Commercial Space Launch Act, there 
is no limit here to this payment—but this supportive clause applies only to launches from 
France. 
During the in-orbit phase this mechanism also applies. A ceiling is set, in case of damage 
the operator has to pay up to that ceiling and the government will take over the cost above 
this ceiling. But for this phase, only damage on earth is taken into consideration, not dam-
age in orbit. As there is extremely little risk of damage on earth for geostationary satellites, 
this constitutes an important limit for satellite telecommunication operators such as Eutel-
sat SA. 
During the discussion within the parliament, the draft has been modified in order to 
limit the liability of the operators. This is considered in Article 13, last paragraph, of the 
Law on Space Operations. For the time being the real effect of this Article is not quite clear. 
The first part of Article 13 copies the Liability Convention, making the operator “fully lia-
ble” for damage caused on the ground or in air space but requiring that a fault is proven 
for damage caused elsewhere. The second paragraph is more controversial: “Except in the 
event of deliberate fault, the liability set out in 1 and 2 above shall cease when all obliga-
tions set by the authorisation or licence have been met, or at the latest one year after the 
date when these obligations should have been met. The Government replaces the operator 
in the event of any damage caused after this date.” 
This provision seems to put the burden of the obligations related to space debris on the 
government, whether or not the obligations for the authorised private operator under the 
Law are met. The question is: what about damage in orbit involving a space objet after the 
period of authorisation? Is the liability really transferred to the government? Is it the case 
even if the victim decides to sue the operator himself? The burden of the risk is then com-
pletely transferred to the state, which seems to be paradoxical because it would mean that 
during the applicability of the authorisation the government would only be partly liable 
(namely over the ceiling) whereas for the period after the one authorised it would be fully 
liable even if the obligations of the authorisation had not been fulfilled or if the launch was 
made outside France. This provision therefore has to be clarified. In any case this kind of 
provision limiting the liability applies only if the French law applies. Given the very inter-
national character of the activity, such a solution for a limitation of the liability had been 
avoided in the draft proposed by the Conseil d’Etat working group because it is not appli-
cable in case of an action outside France’s jurisdiction and may open the door to forum 
shopping. 
Articles 19 and 20 deal with the question of liability between persons having partici-
pated in the activity and protect both from legal actions. It sets a reciprocal waiver of lia-
bility for the benefit of the operator and of the persons taking part. Here also the problem 
of the application of the French Law on Space Operations applies; strong contractual links 
are still needed in order to avoid action outside the French jurisdiction.134 
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